ON A LOW-COMPETITIVENESS COUNTRY JOINING THE EUROZONE:
ARE THERE LESSONS FROM GREECE?  CES Open Forum Series 2018-2019 by Skouras, Thanos
CES Open Forum Series
2019-2020
ON A LOW-COMPETITIVENESS COUNTRY JOINING THE EUROZONE: 
ARE THERE LESSONS FROM GREECE? 
                                 
by: 
                          Thanos Skouras 
About the Series 
The Open Forum Paper Series is designed to present work in progress by current and 
former affiliates of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies (CES) and to 
distribute papers presented at the Center’s seminars and conferences. Any opinions 
expressed in the papers are those of the authors and not of CES. 
Editors
Grzegorz Ekiert and Andrew Martin 
Editorial Board
Peter Hall, Roberto Stefan Foa, Alison Frank Johnson, Torben Iverson, Maya Jasanoff, 
Jytte Klausen, Michele Lamont, Mary D. Lewis, Michael Rosen, Vivien Schmidt, 
Kathleen Thelen, Daniel Ziblatt, Kathrin Zippel
About the Author
Thanos Skouras is Emeritus Professor of Economics at the Athens University of 
Economics and Business. His e-mail address is chlois@aueb.gr.
 
 
Abstract  
Seven remaining states are presently on the Eurozone’s enlargement agenda: Bulgaria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden. Except Sweden, all these countries 
tend to have low competitiveness not only relative to Germany but also to most of the Eurozone 
countries (especially, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands). 
For countries adopting the euro, issues of political economy may have a decisive effect on the 
eventual outcome and largely determine their economic prospects within the Eurozone. The 
Greek experience shows that the intensity of partisan strife is certainly an important element to 
be taken into account in a far from easy assessment of how entry will likely affect the country's 
economic progress. The crucial issue that needs to be considered is whether entry will improve 
or worsen the prospects for a substantial gain in competitiveness. It is the assessment of how 
entry will affect the forces favoring reforms relative to those opposing them that should 
ultimately determine the decision to opt for early or delayed entry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON A LOW-COMPETITIVENESS COUNTRY JOINING THE 
EUROZONE: ARE THERE LESSONS FROM GREECE?  
 
All EU countries are legally obliged to eventually join the single currency once 
they meet the requisite criteria, apart from Denmark, which can easily meet the 
criteria but has a permanent exemption from the obligation to adopt the euro. 
Seven remaining states are presently on the Eurozone’s enlargement agenda: 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden. 
Except Sweden, all these countries tend to have low competitiveness1 not only 
relative to Germany but also to most of the Eurozone countries (especially, 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands). 
Issues of political economy may influence the decisions and path of a low 
competitiveness country in adopting the euro. These can have a decisive effect on 
the eventual outcome and largely determine the country's economic prospects 
within the Eurozone. The Greek experience is examined below for any lessons it 
may provide in this respect.  
 
1  The best known and widely used international indices of competitiveness are produced 
annually by the World Economic Forum (The Global Competitiveness Report) in Geneva and the 
Institute for Management Development (World Competitiveness Yearbook) in Lausanne. 
Competitiveness is a highly composite notion that takes into account a host of factors, not only 
economic but also social and institutional, which are relevant to the efficient functioning of an 
economy. As compiled and calculated by the indices above, it extends far beyond relative labor 
efficiency in production and encompasses the comparison of institutional elements, such as the 
quality and performance of the education system, the legal and judiciary system, labor relations 
and the functioning of the labor market, market structure and the degree of monopoly, as well as 
any other institution that noticeably affects  a country’s economic performance. 
 
A preliminary matter that needs to be clarified is the contrasting effects that the 
entry into the Eurozone has on countries characterized by different 
competitiveness. There is an asymmetry between low and high competitiveness 
countries concerning these effects and it is this asymmetry that justifies the 
separate analysis for low competitiveness countries. 
 
The Eurozone’s leveraging of competitiveness 
A country joining the Eurozone obviously loses all control over both monetary 
and exchange rate policy, which are exercised solely by the European Central 
Bank for the Eurozone as a whole.2 A lot of attention has been given to the 
inappropriateness of a common monetary policy if member countries have quite 
different and contrasting needs, such as being at different phases of the economic 
cycle or, more generally, being faced with asymmetrical shocks. On the contrary, 
the inappropriateness of a common exchange rate for countries of widely differing 
competitiveness has received relatively little attention.3 Yet this is an intrinsic 
problem, which may impede the smooth functioning of the Eurozone and become 
 
2   In practice, the ECB has exercised only monetary policy to achieve the aim of price stability 
with little regard to developments in the exchange rate. 
 
3  The probable cause is that academic economists have tended to be uncomfortable with the 
notion of competitiveness, since it is difficult to accommodate within the established corpus of 
international economic theory. A characteristic example of the reticence of the academic 
profession vis a vis the concept is seen in  Paul Krugman, who has argued that 
“…competitiveness is a meaningless word when applied to national economies. And the 
obsession with competitiveness is both wrong and dangerous”; see, Krugman, P. (1994) 
“Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession”, Foreign Affairs, March-April. See, also, Krugman, 
P. (1996) “Making Sense of the Competitiveness Debate”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
Vol.12, No. 3. 
 
the source of divisive tendencies, by pitting the low- against the high-
competitiveness members of the currency union. 
The union's common exchange rate is inevitably too high for the low-
competitiveness member countries and too low for the high-competitiveness ones. 
Consequently, it further lowers the competitiveness of the former and reinforces 
the competitiveness of the latter. This effect is inevitable on intra-Eurozone trade, 
irrespectively of how the exchange rate is determined. No matter what the 
determining factors and the state of the Eurozone’s current account, the 
competitiveness in intra-Eurozone trade of high-competitiveness member 
countries will be augmented and that of low-competitiveness member countries 
will be weakened. In other words, the common exchange rate, which is an 
inseparable aspect of any economic and monetary union, leverages 
competitiveness positively for high-competitiveness member countries and 
negatively for low-competitiveness ones.4 
The leveraging effect is not contained solely to intra-Eurozone trade. The 
competitiveness of low-competitiveness member countries (LMC) deteriorates 
not only in intra-Eurozone trade, vis a vis that of high-competitiveness member 
countries (HMC), but also in all their trade with the rest of the world. But the 
force of the leveraging effect, in this case, depends on the state of the Eurozone’s 
current account.  
The Eurozone’s current account is strongly influenced by the common exchange 
rate. Though this (like any exchange rate) may be the mostly unpredictable 
outcome of a variety of forces, it tends to reflect the competitiveness of the 
Eurozone’s economy as a whole. More specifically, it reflects the weighted 
 
4  The notion of competitiveness, as well as the leveraging effect for high-competitiveness 
countries and specifically Germany, are analyzed in greater detail in Skouras, T. (2016) 
“Competitiveness and its leverage in a currency union or how Germany gains from the euro”, 
Real-World Economics Review, issue no. 77, 40-49.  
 
average competitiveness of all the member countries (weighted by their share of 
Eurozone trade with the rest of the world).   
If the Eurozone’s current account is over time roughly in balance, it may be 
surmised that its exchange rate reflects the weighted average competitiveness of 
all member countries. In this case, the force of the leveraging effect for the 
members' competitiveness in their trading with the rest of the world is similar to 
their intra-Eurozone trading. It is different though when the Eurozone’s current 
account is in surplus or deficit, implying that the common exchange rate is 
undervalued or overvalued. 
If there is a persistent surplus in the current account indicating that the common 
exchange rate is undervalued, then the competitiveness of all Eurozone members 
is fortified. As a result, the negative leveraging of competitiveness that the 
Eurozone brings about to its low-competitiveness members is mitigated. A 
sufficiently undervalued common exchange rate may even eliminate the negative 
leveraging for the strongest of the low-competitiveness members, especially in the 
case that a high proportion of their trade is with countries outside the Eurozone. 
On the other hand, if there is a persistent deficit in the current account signifying 
that the common exchange rate is overvalued, then the competitiveness of all 
Eurozone members is weakened. The low-competitiveness members then suffer a 
further reduction to their competitiveness and there is, hence, an even greater 
negative leveraging to their competitiveness caused by their participation in the 
Eurozone. 
An analogy may be useful in elucidating the Eurozone's leveraging of 
competitiveness. The handicap system used in diverse sports, such as golf or 
horse races, in order to equalize the chances of winning among contestants of 
widely different abilities, resembles in a crucial respect the workings of the 
foreign exchange market. They both act as regulatory mechanisms that equilibrate 
performance in competitive contexts.  Superior competitiveness in trading is 
associated with a high exchange rate  and superior ability in sports is associated 
with a high handicap while any change in competitiveness or ability tends to be 
accompanied and compensated by a change in the same direction of the exchange 
rate or handicap.   
Now, the compensating change in a country's exchange rate with a change in its 
competitiveness, which the forex market tends to generate, is impeded and abated 
by the country’s participation in the Eurozone (or, more generally, a currency 
union). This is because the country's competitiveness is only a fractional part of 
the entire Eurozone’s competitiveness and the common exchange rate of the 
Eurozone reflects the competitiveness of the union as a whole.5  
The analogy in golf or horse racing would be if a common handicap were 
assigned to a golf club or to a horse stable, shared by all individual members of 
the golf club or horses in the stable. Such an arrangement would obviously grant 
the best performing golf players in the club or horses of the stable an unfair 
advantage and, by the same token, disadvantage the worst performing ones. And 
this not only when competing with other club members or same-stable horses but 
also, more generally, when competing with other golfers or horses that carry a 
handicap based on their individual performance. 
In conclusion, it should be clear that the entry into the Eurozone will have an 
immediate adverse impact on the competitiveness of low-competitiveness 
countries. With the exception of Sweden, all other countries on the agenda of the 
Eurozone's enlargement will find their competitiveness weakened upon joining 
the economic and monetary union.   
 
Joining the Eurozone: Is it worth it? 
There should be no illusion about the immediate cost, in terms of weakening 
competitiveness, that entry into the Eurozone entails for Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. But there are also important 
 
5  The Eurozone’s competitiveness is a weighted average; it is the average competitiveness of all 
the member countries, weighted by their share of the Eurozone’s trade with the rest of the world. 
 
benefits that need to be considered, in order to properly assess the desirability of 
joining the Eurozone. 
A significant benefit that will readily materialize is the increase in economic 
efficiency, which arises from the reduction in transactions costs and the increase 
in intra-Eurozone trade. This is because currency conversion costs are eliminated 
and price transparency is established across the Eurozone, which benefit both 
consumers and producers. In addition, the elimination of the need to hedge against 
the risk of exchange rate fluctuations in trade relations with other countries within 
the Eurozone, further reduce transactions costs, boost trade and reinforce 
efficiency gains. 
But the benefits are not limited to cost reductions and the improvement of 
economic efficiency. There is also an improvement in growth prospects. This is 
due to the betterment of the institutional and business conditions afforded by a 
strong, international currency and enhanced monetary stability. The setting of 
monetary policy by the European Central Bank, even though it may not 
correspond to the needs of the domestic economic cycle, has the important 
advantage of ensuring stability, by completely disengaging monetary policy from 
the dictates of domestic politics and partisan squabbling for political power. 
Furthermore, the effects of greater monetary stability and efficiency improve the 
business climate and investors' confidence, thus encouraging both domestic and 
foreign investment. Finally, investment is also encouraged through another 
channel. The euro's replacement  of the domestic currency tends to reduce country 
risk and this, in conjunction with the elimination of the costs for hedging against 
exchange-rate risk, contribute to lower interest rates and borrowing costs for both 
the public and private sectors.  
In addition to these significant benefits to economic efficiency and growth 
prospects, which amount potentially to a substantial boost in competitiveness, 
there is a greater likelihood of enhanced European assistance. A low-
competitiveness entrant into the Eurozone is likely to be assisted not only in 
improving its competitiveness on the road to entry but also after entry. In 
particular, demands for various programs of technical assistance will most 
probably be satisfied quite readily while financial aid, especially at times of 
emergency, is most likely to be forthcoming, if not out of a deeply felt sense at 
least as a show of solidarity. The fact is that, despite the often intense national 
bickering and antagonisms, the countries within the Eurozone have made a 
decisive political step towards the creation of a European federal state. 
Consequently, sooner or later, it is to be expected that closer cooperation and 
coordination, as well as some transfer of resources, will tend to follow. 
Without forgetting the decisive importance of the political dimension in joining 
the Eurozone, which includes defense and all other geopolitical considerations, let 
us for the moment abstract from it and complete the assessment of its desirability 
from the political economy perspective. The economic advantages presented so 
far are no doubt considerable and possibly adequate for deciding in favor of 
joining the Eurozone but they are not exhaustive.  
An additional important argument that is worth noting is that entry can provide 
the impetus for a determined effort at improving competitiveness. Entry into the 
Eurozone can sharpen the perception both of the required reforms for improving 
competitiveness and especially of the necessity of proceeding with such reforms. 
The “swim or sink” outlook it promotes can be conducive to the undertaking of 
the necessary reforms and the acceptance of present sacrifices for the sake of a 
better future. A government intent on decidedly advancing the country's economic 
prospects and not afraid to undertake the often unpopular reforms may be assisted 
by entry, especially if its implications are explained and understood by the public. 
What needs to be well understood is the fact that a country's economic health and 
prosperity go hand in hand with superior competitiveness.  The reforms and the 
creation of the institutional environment, which improve competitiveness, are 
exactly those that are warranted for bringing about wealth and prosperity. 
A metaphor may be useful in elucidating the considerations involved in deciding 
about joining the Eurozone. Imagine a student who just manages to be offered a 
place into a top university. The student has made a serious effort in the last couple 
of years to get the required grades and has demonstrated the ability and 
willingness for significant self-improvement. Nevertheless, his knowledge lacks 
deep foundations and it is clear that his level of preparation is still below the 
average of his classmates. This will certainly make the attendance of classes, 
which will tend normally to be pitched to the average student, more difficult and 
will demand a greater than average effort on the student's part.  
The crucial question here is whether the student has the self-discipline and 
willingness for sustained hard work, which are necessary to make a success of his 
studies. The university is prepared to offer him the chance but it is up to the 
student to determine the final outcome. If he makes the required effort, his studies 
will be fruitful and his career prospects will greatly benefit; if not, he will have 
wasted his time and money, as well as an opportunity for a good career. Given 
that an extra effort is indispensable for a successful career, it seems reasonable to 
expect that a student intent on securing a good career will put in the extra effort 
needed more readily if he accepts the challenge and takes up the opportunity 
offered by the university than if he declines the offer.  
 
The Greek experience  
Greece adopted the euro in 2001, in time to be among the first countries to use 
euro banknotes and coins on 1 January 2002. This was quite an achievement, 
given that, less than 10 years earlier, all its macroeconomic magnitudes were very 
far from meeting the criteria set by the Maastricht agreement for entry into the 
Eurozone. With inflation, interest rates and budget deficits well into the 2-digit 
range, the goal of early entry seemed unrealistic and out of reach. In the event, the 
only Maastricht criterion that had not been satisfied at the time of entry was that 
of having a public debt less than 60 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, despite being 
about 100 percent, the Greek public debt to GDP ratio was lower than both the 
Italian and Belgian ones. Consequently, given the political importance of 
including Italy and Belgium in the Eurozone, the debt criterion was effectively 
reinterpreted and considered to be fulfilled if there was evidence of a “sustained” 
effort at reducing the public debt to GDP ratio. This really meant that even small 
reductions in this ratio during the 2-3 years prior to entry was deemed sufficient 
evidence of a “sustained” effort. Thus, the European Council at Santa Maria da 
Feira in June 2000 confirmed that Greece satisfied all the Maastricht criteria and 
was to join the Eurozone from its inception. 
In the effort to be included among the first countries to adopt the euro, Greece 
clearly made a remarkable improvement in its macroeconomic magnitudes. It is 
also clear that it would not have succeeded in joining the Eurozone at the time, if 
political considerations did not play a decisive part in the European Council’s 
decision-making. Equally, it would not have succeeded, if the Eurostat's 
methodology were stricter, as it later became, in the estimation of public deficit 
and debt. But Greece was certainly not the only country that would not have 
succeeded in becoming a member of the Eurozone, if it were not for similar 
political considerations and the then existing Eurostat methodology. Greece's 
difference from the other countries that took advantage of these circumstances in 
joining the Eurozone, was its clearly lower competitiveness.6 
Mismanagement after entry 
Greece's low competitiveness was the result of structural weaknesses and institutional 
deficiencies of long standing, exacerbated by wage increases that for many years exceeded 
productivity gains. The Greek economy had satisfied the conditions for entry into the Eurozone, 
which were essentially the preconditions for economic progress, but still needed the necessary 
reforms for a decisive increase in competitiveness, without which it remained a weak and 
 
6  An additional major difference was the intensity of the political parties’ power struggle, which 
led to disregard of the national interest for partisan gain. But more on this below. 
 
vulnerable economy.7 There was, therefore, an urgent need for both wage restraint and overdue 
structural reforms.8  
But this did not happen because political parties, both the one in government and those in 
opposition, were more interested in electoral results than in the country's economic prospects. 
The intentions of both main parties’ leadership (Pasok under Simitis and New Democracy under 
Karamanlis), might well have been quite different. Both strongly proclaimed their intention to 
modernize the economy and reform the public sector but the dynamics of the party apparatus, 
especially when in government, clearly prioritized the retention of power and electoral success 
over structural reforms.9   
The governing party wished to avoid the loss in popularity, which invariably accompanies 
structural reforms, since such reforms tend to be strongly opposed by adversely affected 
organized interests. Its further wish to capitalize on its macroeconomic achievements and 
successful bid to join the Eurozone, by projecting the image of a strong economy, made it 
difficult to resist wage demands. On the other hand, the opposition parties, in their desire to 
belittle the government's economic achievements and blot out the image of a strong economy, 
 
7  The Eurozone environment increased the economy’s vulnerability due to low competitiveness 
but, at the same time, masked it by removing the constraint that a balance of payments deficit 
would have presented if it were not for the euro. 
 
8  The needed reforms in the labor market, tax system and barriers to competition were regularly 
highlighted by the OECD Country Economic Surveys but it was quite evident that wide-ranging 
reforms were (and continue to be) necessary in the justice and education systems, as well as the 
functioning of the public sector and the political parties. 
 
9  The drastic reduction since 2010 of public funds and bank loans provided to political parties, 
which was a condition for continued international lending and led to an acknowledgment of the 
main parties' bankruptcy and a weakening of their hold on Greek society, is one of the most 
promising developments for the future of the Greek democracy and economic policy-making. 
had no qualms in even accusing it of joining the Eurozone by cheating and deception.10 But 
while they may have been right in deriding the strong economy image, their duplicity became 
apparent in their lack of interest in any measures strengthening the economy. Instead, they 
vehemently opposed even the most lukewarm government effort at reform and supported every 
demand by social groups irrespective of the damage caused to competitiveness.  
This unconscionably partisan behavior, which characterized practically the 
totality of the political personnel, made it inevitable that the necessary structural 
reforms would continue to be neglected, competitiveness would further 
deteriorate and the economy's vulnerability would get increasingly worse. In fact, 
the totally unrestrained and sectarian character of the partisan power struggle for 
political advantage and state capture, with its contempt for fairness, rejection of 
 
10  The opposition contested the government's success in achieving entry and in 2004, 
immediately upon being elected to power, disregarded the damage to Greece's reputation and 
proclaimed a fiscal audit to correct the allegedly false fiscal statistics produced by the previous 
government. This resulted in an increase in the budget deficits, including the 1999 deficit on 
which entry was based. The revision, which created the widespread impression that Greece had 
cheated to achieve entry, increased the 1999 budget deficit from 2.5 percent to 3.07 percent of 
GDP. In fact, the marginal overrun (by 0.07 percentage point) of the Maastricht rule was almost 
entirely due to a revised accounting method of recording defence equipment expenditure.  
Moreover, the castigated method was not only allowable by the regulations at the time but was, 
in fact, specified later by the Eurostat as the only appropriate one. [See, Simitis, C. and 
Stournaras, Y. (2012) “Greece did not cause the euro crisis”, The Guardian, 
www.guardian.co.uk, April 26].  Consequently, it is not unreasonable to surmise that the 
government's motivation in ordering an audit and revising the budget deficit figure was to 
discredit the defeated opponent party, which had achieved the Eurozone entry, and at the same 
time to lighten the budgetary burden during its own term of office. As this government proved to 
be the most egregious falsifier of budget deficit statistics in the period leading to the 2009 
elections, it is difficult to believe that its motive was a desire for reliable truthful statistics. 
 
objectivity, disdain for truth and disregard for the general interest, has been the 
main cause of the country's problems in relation to its Eurozone membership. 
It may be admitted that political strife and discord are not new to Greek life and, 
throughout Greece's historical evolution, they have been in most instances the 
root cause of the country's misadventures and failures. Given this, it may then be 
argued that joining the Eurozone was a mistake and that the deterioration in 
competitiveness, due to the political system's inability to carry out the necessary 
reforms, was predictable from the start. Moreover, the decision to adopt the euro 
is to blame for the eventual state bankruptcy and economic crisis, since these were 
brought about, again (more or less) predictably, by the political system’s behavior 
in the face of the conditions created by the euro.11 
The above view, which is not uncommon in Greece, takes the defects and failings 
of the Greek political system as an immutable constant that is not only beyond 
question but should be also the basis of any reasoning in policy decisions. This 
view, which seeks to determine appropriate policy-making by grounding it on and 
aligning it with an unsound situation patently in need of radical change, is bound 
to lead to irrational conclusions and beliefs. An apt analogy is that of a doctor, 
who bases his diagnosis and prescription for an illness on the delinquent character 
of the patient. Because the patient is irascible and irresponsible, he is not 
diagnosed to be ill as he may dispute or even reject the diagnosis and he is not 
prescribed appropriate medication as he will not take it properly or even refuse to 
take it at all. 
The main lesson to be drawn from the Greek experience is that, in order to make a 
success of the decision to join the Eurozone, it is imperative for a low 
competitiveness country’s political system to carry out the structural and 
institutional reforms, which will substantially improve its competitiveness. This 
means that the political system must possess an adequate degree of trust and 
 
11  The counterfactual of what would be the outcome of such a defective political system outside 
the Eurozone is usually glossed over or answered with an appeal to an imaginary idealized past. 
 
understanding among political parties to allow compromise, consensus and 
collaboration on the necessary reform program. These conditions are possible 
only when partisan strife is kept within reasonable bounds and there is at least a 
minimal respect for civil conventions. Constitutional support may be necessary to 
secure such conditions and, if these are missing, it must be possible to reform the 
country's constitution in the desirable direction.12  
Mismanagement at the time of entry 
It should be noted that a certain degree of catching-up In competitiveness may be 
relatively easy to achieve, as it does not involve difficult structural reforms. The 
lack of competitiveness due to excessive past wage increases can be restored by 
setting, before entry into the Eurozone, an adequately devalued exchange rate of 
the existing currency vis a vis the euro, at the time of entry. The decision 
regarding the exchange rate that will become effective at the time of entry is, 
therefore, of great importance because it offers a unique opportunity of an 
immediate and substantial gain in competitiveness. 
There is, in relation to this decision, a possibly secondary but certainly not 
insignificant lesson offered by the Greek experience.  
Greece, preparing for entry into the Eurozone and in consultation with the 
European Commission and the governments of the other member states, decided 
to enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) early in 1998.13 Since setting an 
 
12  But even if the requisite conditions are not there, given the general desirability of their 
presence, the crucial question is whether they are more likely to materialize within or outside the 
Eurozone. 
  
13  The ERM was the system aiming to reduce exchange-rate variability that preceded the single 
currency. It fixed the exchange-rate of national currencies in terms of the European Currency 
Unit (ECU), which was a basket of the currencies of the EU member states that served as the unit 
of account before being replaced at parity by the euro on January 1, 1999. The exchange-rates of 
ECU central value against the drachma was an opportunity to regain 
competitiveness, especially if this were to be the future euro/drachma exchange 
rate, a drachma devaluation relative to its current ECU market value was 
essential. The European Commission and, especially, the German experts 
considered that the desirable level of devaluation was at least 20%. The Greek 
government, on the other hand, contended that 10% was more than enough and 
the technocrats’ discussion, given the wide difference, was left at an impasse. 
Finally, the stalemate was overcome at the political level, by negotiation between 
the Greek and German finance ministers, and the drachma was devalued in March 
16, 1998 by 12.3 percent.14   
As it turned out, inward capital flows following the devaluation resulted in the 
drachma fluctuating well above its central ECU value. On the strength of this, the 
Greek government renewed its demand for a higher drachma/ECU central rate, 
more in step with the forex markets. As a result, with the introduction of the euro 
on January 1, 1999, a minor readjustment was made, implying a devaluation 
against the ECU initial market value of 11.34 percent. Finally, with the drachma 
continuing to fluctuate well above even the new ECU central rate,15 the Greek 
 
national currencies were fixed in terms of a central ECU value and could fluctuate around this 
value within a strictly defined range.  
Entering the ERM in early 1998, was dictated by Greece’s aim to join the Eurozone in June 
2000. The Maastricht treaty stipulated, as one of the conditions for entry into the Eurozone, that 
the exchange rate in terms of the ECU of a candidate country should not change for at least two 
years before entry, with an allowable   band of fluctuations of 15% either side of its ECU central 
value.  
 
14  The negotiation is described by the Greek minister in his book; see, Papantoniou, Y. (2014), 
Στάσεις και Αποστάσεις, Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, σ. 123.   
 
15  It traded about 7 percent above its central value for most of 1999. This was the result of high 
interest rate differentials and favorable expectations concerning Greece’s convergence prospects. 
government managed in January 15, 2000 to reduce the devaluation against the 
initial market value to only 8.1 percent.16  
One can only speculate about the motives of the Greek government in insisting on 
a small devaluation and, thus, missing the only chance of easily gaining 
competitiveness before entry into the Eurozone. The main argument put forward 
was that of avoiding inflationary pressures, which might have endangered the 
fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria for entry. The fear of a cheap drachma 
feeding inflation proved to be unfounded by the actual developments in both 
exchange rates and the inflation rate. But even if it had some justification in the 
beginning of 1998, it held little credence in January 2000. And yet it was at this 
late stage, hardly six months before the formal ratification of Greece's 
entry into the Eurozone, that the drachma was again and more substantially 
revalued.  
Is there another possible motive? A devaluation is never politically popular: It 
makes the country poorer, by reducing its purchasing power in terms of imports, 
and is a clear admission of a weak economy. It affects adversely every buyer of 
imported goods and services, since their prices tend to rise, while internationally 
traded raw materials and commodities as well as foreign travel become decidedly 
more expensive. Though a devaluation’s negative effects are widely felt with no 
delay, the benefits from increased competitiveness are not immediately 
observable and seemingly relevant to a large majority of voters and, in addition, 
there are no organized interests in the country demanding higher competitiveness. 
 
See, Garganas, N. (2000) “Mr. Garganas looks at the challenges for Greek monetary policy on 
the eve of euro-zone entry”, Euromoney International Bond Congress, February 15, London. 
 
16 The initial market value, as of March 12, 1998, was 313.05 drachmas per ECU; see, Bank of 
 
Greece (1998) “Report on Monetary Policy 1997-1998”, April, p.30. The three consecutive  
 
ECU/Euro central rates were 357 (16.3.1998), 353.104 (1.1.1999), 340.75 (15.1.2000); see,  
 
Garganas, N., ibid. 
Consequently, the governing party has an obvious political interest to opt for the 
smallest possible devaluation in joining the Eurozone, especially when this is 
presented as a great success story and proof of its skillful management of the 
economy.    
It is, of course, impossible to know with any degree of certainty the motives of 
historical actors and reliance on plausible conjectures is inevitable. Nevertheless, 
missing a unique opportunity to easily gain competitiveness, especially when it is 
generally recognized that Greece is the least competitive country in the Eurozone 
and in dire need of improving its competitiveness, seems incomprehensible unless 
partisan considerations prevailed. If political party advantage were the real motive 
for this otherwise inexplicable policy decision, it is another instance of the 
country's general interest taking second place to partisan concerns. 
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable: The intensity of party strife and the 
primacy of partisan over national interests have vitiated Greece's potential benefit 
from joining the Eurozone. The political parties have invariably not pushed for 
(when in government) and resisted (when in opposition) the necessary reforms 
and, in effect, inadvertently colluded to undermine the prospects of the Greek 
economy. The political system, including almost without exception the totality of 
the parties and political elite, has wasted the advantages conferred by membership 
of the Eurozone by allowing, if not actively driving, the economy’s low 
competitiveness to deteriorate even further. 
The result of this unrestrained partisan strife leading to deteriorating 
competitiveness has been truly disastrous. Firstly, it led to the bankruptcy of the 
heavily indebted Greek state in 2010, following the international financial crisis 
and the drastic change in perceptions of the international money markets 
regarding country risk. Secondly, partisan strife both deepened the economic 
crisis that accompanied the bankruptcy and inordinately delayed the economy’s 
recovery. At present, and for at least the immediate future, partisan strife and its 
effect on competitiveness continue to be the main determinants of a seriously 
weakened economy’s prospects 
Concluding comments 
 
For Greece today, it seems that the only way forward, if it is to remain and do 
well in the Eurozone, is through a resolute effort to increase investment and gain 
competitiveness. The main obstacle is the operation of the political system. To 
overcome this, the single most important change, that could significantly improve 
the rules of the political game and the partisan conduct, should concern the 
relevant provisions of the constitution. Radical constitutional reform is urgently 
needed to substantially improve the functioning of the political system.17 The 
intensity of partisan strife must be tempered and this is necessary not only to 
improve competitiveness and economic performance but also to arrest the rapid 
erosion of democratic conventions, norms and institutions that is brought about by 
unprincipled party politics and the sectarian stop-at-nothing  struggle for power.  
Is there a lesson to be drawn? Some stalwarts and zealots of the parties opposed to 
the 1999 entry into the Eurozone, blame the early entry for Greece' s predicament 
and no doubt will claim that delayed or even no entry is the lesson to be drawn 
from the Greek experience. But this is based on an idealization of the 
counterfactual alternative.  There is no reason to believe that the political system 
would have functioned any better outside the Eurozone and Greece would have 
certainly missed the opportunity of ample and cheap financing offered by the 
euro. A political class that missed the opportunity of cheap finance to improve the 
economy's productive potential, ignored the incentives and assistance for 
evidently necessary reforms, falsified the national statistics to evade Eurozone 
controls and ran large budget deficits, is not likely to have done better in the 
 
17 It is, of course, not evident how the political system will reform itself in an appropriate manner 
though this is not for lack of ideas. By far the best proposal for constitutional reform (even 
though not a panacea) is the one drafted by Alivizatos, N.,Vourloumis, P., Gerapetritis, G., 
Ktistakis, I., Manos, S., and Spyropoulos, Ph. (2016), An Innovative Constitution for Greece.  
https://www.gcf.ch/essays/an-innovative-constitution-for-greece/ 
absence of Eurozone tutelage. It would have carried on running large budget 
deficits and would have devalued the currency, now under its own control, 
impoverishing the country. Moreover, it would have to face the international 
financial crisis and bankruptcy, which it would not be in a stronger position to 
avoid, without help from the Eurozone.  
Consequently, blaming the euro is to completely misconstrue the cause of the 
Greek tribulations. The economy's real affliction is its low competitiveness and 
any remedy proposed must squarely address this issue rather than evade it. The 
remedy is not to keep out of the euro but to remove the obstacles and effect the 
reforms required to raise competitiveness. And the main obstacle is the 
functioning of the political system.  
The Greek experience shows what may happen when the intensity of political 
strife leads to a mode of governance, shaped conjointly by parties both in 
government and opposition, which not only systematically neglects and impairs 
competitiveness but also mishandles and aggravates a crisis. Even if it is not an 
experience  that is necessarily of direct relevance to other countries in line to join 
the Eurozone, it may serve as a warning tale to them (but also more generally) of 
what could happen when the intensity of partisan strife is excessive, the political 
system malfunctions and the democratic institutions are put at risk.  
Is there a lesson in the Greek experience regarding the timely decision to join the 
Eurozone? Economic welfare is dependent on the level of competitiveness and, 
therefore, the focus should be firmly on how entry will affect competitiveness. 
The necessary increase in competitiveness requires a sustained effort at a broad 
range of reforms. This is more difficult than meeting the macroeconomic 
requirements for entry and depends on the determination of the government, the 
stance of the opposition parties and, more generally, the functioning of the 
political system. Thus, the intensity of partisan strife is an important element to be 
taken seriously into account, in the far from easy assessment of how entry will 
likely affect the country's economic progress. The crucial issue that needs to be 
considered is whether entry will improve or worsen the prospects for a substantial 
gain in competitiveness. In other words, the question that must be answered is 
whether entry will strengthen or weaken the forces for reforms, not only in the 
labor market but also structural and institutional, relative to those opposing them. 
It is the assessment of how entry will affect these forces that should ultimately 
determine the decision to opt for early or delayed entry.  
Finally, in addition to Greece and the candidate countries for euro adoption, there 
is an obvious lesson for the Eurozone that is worth stating forthrightly in closing. 
Competitiveness of member countries should be closely monitored18 and, short of 
adding an appropriate level of competitiveness to the Maastricht macroeconomic 
criteria, the importance of competitiveness and requisite reforms should be 
strongly emphasized to candidate countries aspiring to entry. 
  
 
 
 
18 Unfortunately, productivity instead of competitiveness is presently monitored. See, Skouras, T. 
 
(2016) “Correcting The Euro’s Flawed Architecture Demands A Focus On Competitiveness  
 
Rather Than Productivity”, Social Europe, November 1. 
